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Abstract 
We present data of a contingent valuation (CV) survey, testing the effect of Evaluation Mode 
(EM) on the monetary valuation of preventing road accidents. Half of the interviewees was 
asked to state their Willingness to Pay (WTP) to reduce the risk of having only one type of 
injury (Separate Evaluation, SE), while the other half of the sample was asked to state their 
WTP for four types of injuries evaluated simultaneously (Joint Evaluation, JE). In the SE 
group we observed lack of sensitivity to scope while in the JE group WTP increased with the 
severity of the injury prevented. However, WTP values in this group were subject to context 
effects. Our results suggest that the traditional explanation of the disparity between SE and 
JE, namely, the so-called “Evaluability”, does not apply here. The paper presents new 
explanations based on the role of preference imprecision. 
Keywords: contingent valuation, evaluation mode, road safety, evaluability, health states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a debate about the validity of contingent valuation (CV) as an appropriate 
technique to inform social policies. While some critics (Hausman, 2012) think that it is a 
“hopeless” method, others (Carson, 2012) consider that, although the method is not perfect, 
it can be a useful technique to incorporate people’s preferences in public decisions. An 
important part of the dispute focuses on the issue of scope effects. In order to improve the 
method, Heberlein et al. (2005) consider that “we need to better understand the conditions 
that produce scope failure” (p. 2). In this spirit, this paper focuses on the Evaluation Mode 
(Separate vs. Joint). We study whether evaluation mode makes a difference in the 
sensitivity of responses to scope in the specific domain of health state valuations. 
There is a good deal of evidence (Hsee, 1996; Hsee et al., 1999; Hsee and Zhang, 2010; 
Bazerman et al., 1999) showing that subjects perceive he value of objects differently when 
they are presented in isolation (Separate Evaluation Mode –SE) or together (Joint 
Evaluation Mode -JE) and a mismatch between SE and JE valuations arise. More 
specifically, some individuals are willing to pay more for object A than for B when they are 
evaluated independently (SE) but are willing to pay more for B than for A when they are 
presented together (JE). This type of preference reversal has implications for the use of CV 
in public policy. Most public decisions involve choosing between alternative ways of 
spending a budget (i.e. Joint Evaluation Mode) while most CV studies elicit the monetary 
value of each policy independently from each other (i.e. Separate Evaluation Mode). If the 
values are different, which one (if any) should guide public policy?   
The disparity between evaluation modes (EMs) has also been observed in the health domain 
(Lacey et al., 2006; Donaldson et al 2008; Gyrd-Hansen et al., 2011; Lacey et al., 2011) 
although only one of these papers (Donaldson et al 2008) deals with the monetary value of 
health. In Lacey et al. (2006) participants evaluated two health states, on a rating scale, 
using the two evaluation modes. They did not observe preference reversals but they found 
that the distance between the two health states was larger in JE than in SE. Gyrd-Hansen et 
al (2011) observed that subjects were more sensitive to the magnitude of risk reduction in 
JE than in SE. Thus both papers show that subjects are more sensitive to the magnitude of 
the object being evaluated in the JE mode. Donaldson et al (2008) estimated WTP for three 
different cancer programs (screening, treatment, rehabilitation) in different samples. Some 
subjects were asked to state their WTP for only one cancer program (SE) whereas some 
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other subjects were asked their WTP for two cancer programs (JE). They found that WTP 
changed with the EM and they attributed this result to the different amount of information 
that people have in each EM. Probably because of that explanation they seem to suggest 
that JE is a better EM when they stated that subjects in JE “will also understand better the 
respective impact of each of the programmes on their health” (p.5). We will offer in this 
paper a different explanation of the difference between EMs that does not lead so clearly to 
conclude that JE is a better EM. Moreover, the results of  Donaldson et al (2008) do not 
shed light on the potential influence of EMs in the debate on scope effects since there was 
not any clear ranking between the three cancer programs. They were just different goods 
that did not differ on the amount of benefit provided (a priori). Some indirect evidence 
about the effect of the EM can be the literature on reference goods. Smith (2007) observed 
that subjects were willing to pay more for one health improvement when they were given 
information about the cost of an expensive intervention (the reference good) than when they 
were not given that information. 
Given this evidence, we hypothesize that JE will increase sensitivity to scope in relation to 
SE. In this paper we present data of a large (n=2016) Computer Assisted Personal Interview 
(CAPI) survey aimed at obtaining the monetary value of the risk reduction of road traffic 
injuries of different severity. Half of the sample was asked to state their Willingness to Pay 
(WTP) to reduce the risk of having only one type of injury (SE group), while half of the 
sample was asked to state their WTP for four types of injuries evaluated simultaneously (JE 
group). The first contribution of this paper is providing evidence about the link between the 
EM and sensitivity to scope in a WTP study dealing with health outcomes. More 
specifically, we test the hypothesis that JE improves sensitivity to scope in relation to SE. 
The second contribution of the paper is providing a new theoretical interpretation of the 
reasons behind this result. We suggest that higher sensitivity to scope in JE can be due to 
the combined effect of preference imprecision and people’s attempt to be internally 
consistent in their responses. This new theoretical interpretation is important because from 
showing that JE improves sensitivity to scope, it could be concluded that JE is a better EM. 
However, we will show that this conclusion is not so straightforward. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first review the literature that relates EM and scope 
effects. Given that there is no evidence of this relationship in the health domain we will 
provide evidence gathered in other areas. This provides the theoretical framework of the 
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paper. Then we proceed to present the survey. In the fourth part we show the results. 
Although the main objective of the paper is to compare the two EMs in relation to scope 
effects, we also include an analysis of the results within JE, since we think this contributes 
toward a better understanding of the elements that influence responses. The discussion of 
results closes the paper. 
2. EVALUATION MODES AND SCOPE EFFECTS IN CONTINGENT 
VALUATION 
2.1. The effect of the Evaluation Mode 
The literature about the effect of different EMs in CV studies is scant in economics. List 
(2002) asked subjects to state their monetary value of two different sets of baseball cards. 
One set of 10 cards (the “less” set) with a book value of about $15 and a set of 13 cards (the 
“more” set) comprising the same 10 cards as in the “less” set plus 3 additional cards of 
lower quality with a book value of $18. Subjects provided a higher monetary value to the 
“less” set than to the “more” set in SE but a lower monetary value in JE. This is the so-
called “more is less phenomenon” (Hsee, 1998). This result was replicated in Alevy et al. 
(2011) and it was extended to environmental goods (wetlands clean-up and farmland 
preservation). In the case of wetlands the “less” group had to state their WTP for “an entire 
cleanup of 500 acres of wetlands” and in the “more” group the good to be valued was “an 
entire cleanup of 500 acres of wetlands and a partial cleanup of 50 acres”. In the case of 
farmland the two goods were “permanently preserve 500 acres of Maryland farmland” and 
“permanently preserve 500 acres and temporarily (5 years) preserve 50 acres of Maryland 
farmland”. Subjects were willing to pay the same for both goods in SE but they were 
willing to pay more for the good providing more benefit in JE. The effect in environmental 
goods was not as strong as with baseball cards, that is, instead of “more is less” they found 
that “more is the same”. For this reason, Alevy et al. (2011) made a distinction between 
strong EM effects (“more is less”) and weak EM effect (“more is the same”). Given that in 
both papers the results of JE are in line with normative theory (i.e. higher WTP for better 
goods) it could be thought that JE is a better EM. However, this depends on the way that 
those results are explained, as we show next. 
The main explanation of the EM effect on preferences has been Evaluability (Hsee, 1996). 
In order to explain the concept of Evaluability and how it relates to scope effects we will 
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consider a model typically used in psychophysics and illustrated here in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Two functions are necessary to value an object using WTP (or any other response scale). 
One function (H) generates the impact of the object on the subjectivity of the individual 
(e.g. how well or badly this object is perceived). The other function (J) associates the 
response scale to the subjective impression. Hsee and Zhang (2010) define Evaluability as 
“the extent to which a person has relevant reference information to gauge the desirability of 
target values and map them onto evaluation” (pp. 344-345). This definition implies that 
Evaluability encompasses two different aspects: how easy it is for people to figure out how 
much utility an object is going to generate (“desirability”) and how easy it is for people to 
translate (“map”) this on the scale that is used to estimate the value of objects (money in 
CV). Desirability relates to the H function while mapping relates to the J function. We will 
show how these two elements of Evaluability relate to sensitivity to scope in JE. It is 
important to disentangle the origin of these effects since they may have implications for the 
normative status of each EM as a guide to public policy. One example of the use of JE vs. 
SE to disentangle the effect of the H and J functions in health is the study by Lacey et al 
(2011). They observed that patients and members of the general population value several 
health problems differently using a Visual Analogue Scale. They try to show if this 
disparity is produced by Visual Analogue Scale being used differently by the two groups 
(the J function) or because health is perceived differently (the H function). 
2.2. Information Effects 
The first reason that could lead to higher sensitivity to scope in JE is that in this EM 
subjects have more and better information to evaluate the quality of products. This helps 
subjects to understand more clearly how much utility an object can produce, how desirable 
it is (the H function) and how much they are willing to pay for the better object (scope 
effects). One reason that explains this effect is that some attributes are difficult to evaluate 
in isolation (in SE). One classic example (Hsee, 1996) is the choice between two 
dictionaries that are defined by two attributes, namely, the number of words and how new 
they look. The attribute that is easy to evaluate in SE is how new it looks while the number 
of words is difficult to evaluate in isolation. The consequence is that in SE the difficult-to-
evaluate attribute is underweighted. However, in JE subjects can compare the number of 
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words of the dictionaries and it is easier for them to judge the quality of the dictionary by 
performing relative comparisons. In this case JE is more sensitive to scope (number of 
words) because it provides more “relevant reference information”. This explanation is used 
by Lacey et al (2006) to explain some of their results when they state that the descriptions 
of health problems in JE provided “useful information about the range of severity that can 
be expected for the disease” (p.151). In the same way Gyrd-Hansen et al (2011) claim that 
the reduced sensitivity to differences in risk reduction in separate evaluations could be 
produced by the lack of comparators (i.e. lack of reference information). In the case of 
Smith (2007) this reference information is provided by the cost of the reference good. 
Donaldson et al (2008) conclude that “the main possibility of differences between JE and 
SE being due to informational effects” (p.15). 
A second reason, also related to information, is that in JE subjects use wider frames in order 
to evaluate products. Assume that we evaluate two objects (A and B) and that A is, 
objectively, better than B. For example, A is a premium smartphone and B is a mid-range 
smartphone. However, assume that A is the worst within premium smartphones while B is 
the best within mid-range smartphones. Leclerc et al. (2005) show that in SE each object is 
evaluated within its category (what they call narrow focusing) leading to lower WTP for the 
best smartphone. This effect disappears in JE since subjects compare between mid-range 
and premium smart phones and are willing to pay more for the premium smartphone. That 
is, WTP reflects the objective ranking 𝐴 ≻ 𝐵. Again, if this is the explanation of the 
difference between SE and JE it seems logical to conclude that JE is a better EM to guide 
public policy. The disparity between EMs has also been explained in terms of a change in 
reference point (Leclerc et al., 2005). In SE each object is evaluated using its immediate 
category (e.g. premium smartphones) as the reference point. This implies that in SE each 
object is considered good or bad according to its ranking position in its own category. In JE 
each smartphone is compared against the other so the reference point is an object of a 
different category. This implies that subjects use a wider frame of reference in JE than in 
SE. It seems that this kind of argument is also used by Donaldson et al (2008) when they 
state that in SE subjects evaluate health programs in relation to inappropriate reference 
points while in JE a relevant alternative is presented. In summary, more information in JE 
leads to better reference points. 
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2.3. Imprecision/stochastic preferences 
Differences between EM in CV studies may also reflect the difficulty that people have in 
measuring the desirability of an object with the money metric [J (X)]. Even if subjects have 
a good idea of how good an object is [H (X)] and attributes are evaluable in isolation, 
subjects may find it difficult to estimate with precision the monetary equivalent of the 
utility gain they can get from the consumption of some objects. 
To explain how imprecision can account for discrepancies between both EMs, we assume 
that preferences are stochastic - the same subject might respond in a slightly different way to 
the same WTP question in different moments. We can think of individual preferences as a 
distribution of WTP values that the subject thinks are “reasonable” for an object (in our case 
to avoid a health problem). The WTP of one subject for object g will be defined as a random 
variable 𝐿𝑔, so 𝐿𝑔 = {𝑝1
𝑔, 𝑊𝑇𝑃1
𝑔;  𝑝2
𝑔, 𝑊𝑇𝑃2
𝑔; … ; 𝑝𝑛
𝑔, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑛
𝑔} where 𝑝1
𝑔
…𝑝𝑛
𝑔
 denotes the 
probabilities of stating a certain WTP amount (WTP1, WTP2, …, WTPn) in a CV survey. We 
assume that the Expected Value 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑔)] of the distribution is the parameter that the CV 
survey has to estimate. We show next that if preferences are stochastic SE and JE can 
produce different results. 
Assume that one subject responds to a WTP question for object g in SE mode. If her 
preferences are stochastic we assume that what the subject does is to choose one WTP value 
from 𝐿𝑔. Assume that, later on, she is asked a WTP question for object f. She responds 
choosing one number from 𝐿𝑓. Let us assume that (as will be the case in our study) g 
dominates f, that is, g is better than f in some dimensions and it is not worse than f in the rest 
of the dimensions (e.g. f is the “less” object and g is the “more” object). If there is some 
overlap between 𝐿𝑔and 𝐿𝑓  then in SE, because of the degree of overlapping, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑔 < 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑓  
could be observed. We hypothesise that the subject will not choose any pair (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑔, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑓 ) 
such that 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑔 < 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑓  in JE since she will try to be internally consistent between the two 
WTP amounts stated. She may apply a social norm, in line with Norm Theory (Kahneman 
and Miller, 1986), that says you are expected to pay more for something that is better. If this 
is the case, subjects will not use the whole distributions 𝐿𝑔 and 𝐿𝑓 in JE when they respond to 
WTP questions. Subjects will truncate those distributions in order to avoid transparent 
violations of dominance (the social norm). The combined effect of stochastic preferences and 
the use of truncated distributions imply that the distance between 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑔)] and 
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𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑓)] will be larger in JE than in SE. Let us use an example to clarify this point. 
Assume that the probability distributions for f and g are, respectively, {4, 5, 6} and {5, 6, 7} 
with p1=p2=p3=1/3 so 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑓)]=5 and 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑔)]=6 in SE. However, in JE subjects will 
only use WTP pairs that do not violate dominance. That is, [{4,5}, {4,6}, {4,7}, {5,6}, {5,7}, 
{6,7}]. This implies that 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑓)]=4.66 and 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑔)]=6.3 in JE. Furthermore, even if 
subjects are not sensitive to scope in SE and 𝐿𝑔=𝐿𝑓, the theory just explained will predict that 
𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑔)] will be larger than 𝐸[𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑓)] in JE, indicating that we could observe 
sensitivity to scope in JE and insensitivity to scope in SE. 
The idea that preferences are stochastic has a long tradition in economics (Mosteller and 
Nogee, 1951). Individual preferences are probabilistic and they are better represented by 
probability distributions than by a single value (deterministic preferences). There is 
evidence that moving from deterministic to stochastic preferences is all we need to explain 
some non-standard preferences. One example is Butler and Loomes (2007) who show how 
stochastic/imprecise preferences can explain preference reversals between matching and 
choice. Another example is Blavatskyy’s (2007) truncated error model. This model explains 
violations of Expected Utility using two characteristics of preferences that we also use in 
this paper. One is that probability distributions can (sometimes) be truncated. The second 
one is that people do not commit transparent errors; for example people never choose a 
dominated alternative when dominance is transparent. Those assumptions can explain some 
biases in the way that people value objects. For example, assume that subjects have to state 
the monetary equivalent of a lottery with two monetary outcomes. Blavatskyy (2007) 
assumes that this monetary equivalent can be represented by a stochastic variable that is 
truncated by the two monetary outcomes of the lottery. Nobody will state a monetary 
equivalent larger than the highest outcome of the lottery or lower than the lowest outcome. 
This model implies that lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest 
possible outcome are more likely to be overvalued than undervalued (and vice versa). 
Similarly, our model assumes that imprecision and the attempt to be internally consistent 
leads to truncated distributions in JE as explained above.  
In this section we have presented two reasons that can explain why JE can produce WTP 
values in line with sensitivity to scope; our study can also help to understand those reasons. 
If JE is more sensitive to scope because it provides the relevant information, the difference 
between SE and JE will vanish if we also give this information to those who are in SE. In 
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fact, there is some evidence that would support this explanation. Sher and McKenzie (2014) 
showed one group of subjects (group 1) objects A and B and they were asked to provide 
their WTP only for object A. They also presented objects A and B to another group (group 
2) but they were asked their WTP only for object B. Finally, they asked another group 
(group 3) their WTP for objects A and B in JE. They found that WTP was the same in SE 
and in JE. This result is important since it suggests that giving more information led to more 
consistent results. Our second explanation in terms of stochastic preferences and internal 
consistency would not hold. 
In summary, if the disparity between EMs disappears when subjects have the same 
information in SE and JE we can conclude that the difference between EMs is from varying 
information they convey. The implication would be that public policy should be based on 
WTP elicited in the JE mode or, at least, in SE mode subjects should be provided the same 
information received by those who are in JE mode. If the disparity between EM is not 
reduced when subjects have the same information in both EMs the implications are 
different. In this case, it is not so clear that JE is a better normative EM than SE. This paper 
aims at providing more evidence about the reasons of the relationship between the EMs and 
scope sensitivity that could serve as an input for a normative choice between EMs. 
3. THE SURVEY 
3.1. Participants and design 
The survey was part of a project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Transport in order to 
estimate the value of non-fatal road injuries in road traffic accidents. A sample of 2016 
subjects, representative of the Spanish adult general population was recruited. Respondents 
were selected by means of proportional stratified sampling by region, place of residence, 
sex and age of the respondent. 
Eight different types of injuries (S1, S2, ..., S8) were selected based on Jones-Lee et al. 
(1995). Some minor modifications were made in order to produce dominance between all 
injuries. Dominance is interpreted here as a clear ranking in terms of severity, that is, S1 ≽
⋯ ≽ S8. The descriptions of the health states can be seen in the Appendix. These 
descriptions were presented to the respondents labelled as F, W, X, V, S, R, N and L, 
respectively, to avoid any suggested severity order. 
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The survey was administered through CAPI. The first part of the survey was an introduction 
that gave subjects information about the risk of road accidents in Spain. We also collected 
information about car use and attitudes toward road safety and perceptions about subjective 
risk. 
Subjects were randomly allocated into 8 subgroups. Each group evaluated four of the eight 
different injuries using Ranking, Visual Analogue Scales and a Modified Standard Gamble 
(MSG) method before proceeding to the CV question(s) (see Table I). The rest of the 
questionnaire aimed at collecting socio-demographic information. 
INSERT TABLE I 
As shown in Table I, in all groups subjects had to rank four injuries as well as value them 
through the VAS and the MSG with the differences between SE and JE groups occurring in 
the CV tasks. In groups 1 to 4 (SE), respondents only saw the description of the injury they 
had to value using WTP. On the contrary, subjects in groups 5 to 8 (JE) were presented with 
the four health states they were going to value on the same screen, and then were asked 
their WTP to reduce the risk of each of the injuries. 
3.2. Framing and CV elicitation 
The Ranking task was very simple since subjects had to rank the health states from best to 
worst. Once they had ranked the four health states they had to value them on a line with the 
extremes identified as the “Best Imaginable Health State” (value 100) and the “Worst 
Imaginable Health State” (value 0). They also had to place "full health" and “death” on this 
scale and could say if some health states were so bad that they preferred to be dead rather 
than suffering those health states. After this task they had to evaluate the same four health 
states, randomly ordered, using a MSG. In this method, subjects are asked to choose 
between two lotteries. In one lottery, the outcomes are Full Health (FH) and Death (D), 
while in the other lottery, they are the health state to be evaluated (S1…S8) and Death (D). 
In the gamble with outcomes (S1…S8) and D the risk of death was fixed at 0.001 (1 in 
1000), so lottery A is [0.999, Si; D] i=1,…8. The probabilities (p) in the other lottery [p, 
FH; D] were adjusted until indifference was reached. Applications of the MSG are found in 
other studies (Carthy et al., 1998; Law et al., 1998; Bleichrodt et al., 2007; and Robinson et 
al., 2015). The relevant point for this paper is to stress that subjects were very familiar with 
the four health states they had to value in monetary terms before proceeding to the CV 
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questions, both in SE and in JE. 
Figure 2 is a screenshot of the CV question for group 1 in SE. The task was explained to the 
subjects and they were only shown the description of the only injury they were going to 
value using WTP, in this case injury F (i.e. S1) (see left panel in Figure 2). They were told 
that there was a new safety device that could reduce injuries like F (in the example) in the 
case of a car accident from 15 to 10 in 100000. The safety device was personal and it had a 
lifespan of 1 year. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
An example of the CV question is as follows2: 
“Suppose you are offered a safety device, recently discovered, that can reduce the risk of 
health status F as a result of a traffic accident. This device, which is individual, can be used 
in any means of transport and has a lifespan of one year. 
Suppose your risk of injury, such as F, as a result of a traffic accident is 15 in 100000 and 
that there exists a safety device that will reduce your risk of health status, such as F, in a 
traffic accident by 5 / 100000, from 15 in 100000 to 10 in 100000.” 
We used a set of payment cards in order to ask WTP questions. Each card represented an 
amount of Euros among these quantities: 10, 30, 50, 100, 150, 300, 600, 1000, 3000, 
6000, 10000, 30000, 100000 and 300000. The method can be seen with the help of the right 
panel of Figure 2. A payment card showing a certain amount of money randomly appeared 
at the centre of the screen, and respondents had to assign the card to one of the next 
categories: a) “I would pay this amount for sure” (square at the right); b) “I would not pay 
this amount for sure” (square at the left) and; c) “I am not sure whether I would pay or 
not” (square at the bottom). For example, in Figure 2 a hypothetical respondent would 
definitely pay €50 or less and would definitely not pay €100 or more. When all the cards 
were allocated to the corresponding categories an open-ended question enquired about the 
maximum amount of money they would pay within the range defined by the highest amount 
                                                          
2 In the introductory part of the survey a question was presented to subjects in order to check whether they 
understood risk ratios. The question was: “Imagine that the probability of dying from a car accident is 1% (1 in 
100 fatal accidents). In this situation, how many people would die for each group of 1,000?” 97.17% of 
respondents answered the expected and correct answer (i.e. "10 people"). Then they were asked how many 
people would die for each group of 10,000. In this case 94,59% were correct (i.e. answered "100 people"). The 
huge majority, 94%, answered correctly both questions. 
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that they would pay for sure and the lowest amount that they would not pay for sure (in our 
example between €50 and €100). This open response is the WTP that we use in this study. 
During the whole process the description of the injury being valued was shown to the 
respondents on a paper card that was placed in front of them. 
In JE subjects were first shown a screen with the four health states that they had to evaluate 
(Figure 3). It was explained that road traffic accidents could generate injuries of different 
severity and they were shown the four that they had already seen before in the VAS and in 
the MSG exercise. They were told that were going to be offered four different devices that 
could reduce the risk of having four different types of injuries. Each device could reduce the 
risk of one of those injuries. As in SE they were told that others could not use this device 
and the risk reduction was effective only over the next annual period. Then they moved to a 
sequence of four different screens. Each of the four screens was identical to the screen that 
was used to ask the WTP question in SE. The order of the injuries was random. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
3.3. Hypotheses 
This design makes it possible to test several hypotheses. If information is the explanation 
behind the disparity between SE and JE, we hypothesise that in our survey there will be no 
differences between EMs. That is, 
H1: WTP(Si)SE=WTP(Si)JE for i=1, 3, 4 and 6. 
The reason for this hypothesis is that subjects in SE had the same relevant information as 
subjects in JE when they were asked the WTP question. All groups, in SE and JE had 
evaluated the same set of health states using different techniques (Ranking, Visual Analogue 
Scale and Standard Gamble) before the CV exercise so we assume that they had the same 
relevant reference information in both EMs. 
If this hypothesis does not hold and WTP in SE and JE are different, the explanation in terms 
of Preference Imprecision and Internal Consistency can be tested. We then make the next 
hypotheses: 
H2: WTP(S1)JE<WTP(S1)SE. 
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H3: WTP(S3)JE<WTP(S3)SE. 
H4:  WTP(S6)JE>WTP(S6)SE. 
These come from the theory provided in section 2.3. Since S1 and S3 are the less severe 
health states in their respective groups in JE Preference Imprecision/Internal Consistency 
predicts that WTP distributions will be truncated from above (the part of the distribution with 
higher values). In the case of S6 it is the opposite. While for S4 no clear prediction can be 
made since it is in the middle and truncation can affect both sides of the distribution of WTP 
values. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Sample characteristics 
Socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of our sample can be seen in Table II for 
the total sample and for each of the eight groups. We also show the distribution of adult 
population with respect to age and gender, according to the Spanish 2011 census, and with 
respect to education, marital status and employment status, according to the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS).3 In general, our sample resembles the characteristics of the population. More 
information was collected about other characteristics as shown in Table II. We performed a 
Chi2 test for independence between groups and each of the characteristics. We could only 
reject the null hypothesis for employment status at 5% of error. All the remaining 
characteristics appear to be equally distributed among groups. 
INSERT TABLE II 
4.2. Testing the hypotheses 
The impact of the EM on WTP can be seen in Table . We deal with outliers in two different 
ways. The first one is trimming, specifically we trimmed the top 2% of the values (5 
observations per group). The second is winsorization (Kahneman and Ritov, 1994), that is 
the 12 highest observations (about 5% of each group) were substituted with the value of the 
13th highest one. On the lower part of the scale nothing was changed since the 13th lowest 
observation always coincided with the 12 previous observations (they were 0). We prefer to 
                                                          
3 See report on the 1st quarter of the 2011 Spanish Labor Force Survey in: 
http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4211/epa0111.pdf. 
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present the results using winsorization because it does not change the shape of the 
distribution. Nonetheless the results of the statistical tests are the same using winsorization 
or removing 5 outliers. Means and medians are also very similar with the two strategies we 
used to deal with outliers. 
INSERT TABLE III 
We can see that means and medians follow the expected pattern (the higher the severity of 
the health state, the higher the WTP) in JE. In SE medians are the same for S1 and S3 and 
they are also the same for S4 and S6. This suggests insensitivity to scope in SE for some 
comparisons. In SE there were no statistically significant differences between S1 and S3 or 
between S4 and S6 showing lack of scope sensitivity. However, statistically significant 
differences (p-value<0.01) were found between all health states in JE. 
It can be seen that H1 does not hold in most of the cases. Only in two cases -S3 and S4 
(group 7)- there are no differences between SE and JE. In the rest of the cases, differences 
are in line with hypotheses H2, H3 and H4. H2 holds in the two tests, that is, 𝑆1𝑆𝐸is greater 
than 𝑆1𝐽𝐸
𝐺5 and 𝑆1𝐽𝐸
𝐺8. H3 holds when 𝑆3𝑆𝐸  is compared with 𝑆3𝐽𝐸
𝐺6. H4 holds in the two tests. 
However, in the case of S4 we do not observe a clear pattern, as we could expect from 
theory. In one case the WTP is higher in SE than in JE and in the other case it is the 
opposite. Overall, the results suggest that the explanation of the data in terms of Imprecision 
plus Internal Consistency seems plausible. Information cannot account for differences 
between EMs given that it was the same in all groups. 
In relation to sensitivity to scope, we can see that, in SE, subjects were not sensitive to 
scope between health states S1 and S3 while in JE, they were sensitive to scope in all cases. 
However, even when subjects were sensitive to scope in SE there were clear differences in 
the values elicited with SE or JE. There is much more overlap in the WTP distributions in 
SE than in JE. This is clearly seen in the box-plot diagram in Figure 4. The consequence of 
the above is that the relative values of health states are very different in the two EMs. In JE 
the ratios of WTP values are more extreme. For example, in JE the ratio of means between 
injury S1 and S6 is 8.11 (€635.9/€78.4) while in SE is 2.4 (€436.7/€181.3). This implies 
that avoiding one injury like S6 is equivalent to avoiding 8 injuries like S1 using JE but 
only 2.4 injuries like S1 using SE. 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 
4.3. Further results 
Other results suggest that WTP values in JE are influenced to some extent by some kind of 
strategy used by subjects to be internally consistent. We can see (Table IV) that in almost 
all cases the differences between WTP values are statistically significant within each group 
even if health states are not too different (e.g. S1 and S2). However, there were several 
cases where the differences did not reach statistical significance when health states were 
compared between groups even within JE. 
INSERT TABLE IV 
Another result that adds to this evidence is presented in Table V. We show the percentage 
of subjects who made a mistake (reported a higher WTP for the less severe health state) and 
the percentage of subjects who reported exactly the same WTP. Those results suggest some 
kind of process to be internally consistent. If subjects had responded to each WTP question 
independently from each other, we would have observed a fair amount of errors for similar 
health states (e.g. S1 vs. S2) and almost no errors for very different health states (e.g. S1 vs. 
S8). Errors should have been inversely related to the difference between the severity of 
health states. We do not observe anything like that. Instead, we see almost no errors in all 
cases, no matter how similar or dissimilar the health states are, and a large number of 
subjects providing exactly the same response for health states that are different. We 
interpret that result as evidence of Internal Consistency. That is, subjects are not sure about 
which is their true WTP but they understand that it is illogical to pay more for something 
worse (the Norm). However it appears that they do not see anything wrong in providing the 
same response to two different health states. 
INSERT TABLE V 
4. DISCUSSION 
We have seen that the values elicited for different health states change with the EM used to 
elicit preferences. More specifically, we have seen that in SE subjects are (to some extent) 
insensitive to scope. We have also seen that in JE subjects discriminate more between 
health states. Similar results have also been observed in Lacey et al (2006) and Gyrd-
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Hansen et al (2011). Lacey et al (2006) find that the difference between the value of a mild 
and a severe lung problem increased from 21 points in SE to 54 points in JE on a 0-100 
rating scale. Gyrd-Hansen et al (2011) observed that the differences between two different 
risk reductions were higher in JE than in SE. Another result, in line with our findings, in 
Gyrd-Hansen et al (2011) is that 52.5% of subjects in JE gave the same value to two 
different risk reductions but nobody gave a higher value to the smallest risk reduction. This 
suggests some kind of effort from subjects to be internally consistent, as it also seems to be 
happening in our study. 
Differences between EMs have usually been attributed to informational effects 
(Evaluability). Donaldson et al. (2008) find that WTP for a cancer screening program is 
more likely to be higher when elicited together with a treatment or a rehabilitation 
programme (JE). Similar results are obtained, though less conclusive, for the treatment and 
rehabilitation programmes and they attribute these findings to informational effects. We 
argue in this paper that Evaluability does not seem to be the only explanation of the 
disparity between EMs. In fact, in the case of health states we could assume that subjects 
should be more or less familiar with the severity of health outcomes. As Lacey et al (2006) 
say “in the case of our lung disease scenarios, the evaluability of lung disease severity 
should not have been especially poor” (p. 151). We think that most subjects would be able 
to think of a mild headache as a mild health problem and of a metastatic cancer as a very 
severe problem without the need of the information provided by the study. This is why it is 
important to explain the effect of Response Mode in a different way, as done in this paper. 
We present a complementary explanation based on the stochastic nature of human 
preferences combined with the attempt to be internally consistent. 
We started our paper asking if CV can be improved using JE Mode. If by “improving” we 
mean to produce values that are more sensitive to scope, the answer is affirmative: JE 
produces values that are more in line with what we would expect from theory. However, 
this cannot be attributed to improved Evaluability, i.e. subjects understanding better how 
severe a health problem is. Part of the explanation of the scope effects that we have 
observed in JE seems to reflect the adjustments that subjects make in order to be internally 
consistent. What are the implications of this finding for CV? Should we elicit WTP values 
in SE or in JE? 
We think that there are several ways to respond to those questions depending on views 
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about preferences. Under the assumption that social policy should be based on consistent 
and stable individual preferences, our results could be read as supporting the idea that CV 
cannot be trusted. In theory, preferences should not depend on the EM. However, we see 
that they do vary depending on the EM. A different approach is to accept that WTP 
questions for risk reductions are difficult for members of the general population and that, 
even if they are imprecise and stochastic, they provide valuable information for the social 
decision maker. For those who hold this second view, we provide some arguments to 
defend the use of JE. 
First, we may think that the internal consistency observed in JE is an example of Coherent 
Arbitrariness (Ariely et al., 2003) and it does not provide any evidence for the superiority of 
JE over SE. However, we do not think that WTP responses in JE can necessarily be 
understood as “arbitrary”. In Experiment 1 of Ariely et al. (2003) the first response is 
considered “arbitrary” because subjects are influenced by a random (arbitrary) number (the 
last two digits of their Social Security number). This does not have to be the case in our 
study. We can assume that the first response comes from a set of values that are all 
“reasonable” (or “true”) for the subject. Their response is stochastic but not arbitrary. Also, 
the social norm that regulates the second response is not arbitrary but normatively appealing. 
The fact that subjects try to be internally consistent in JE does not imply that the values 
elicited using JE are totally arbitrary or that they do not have normative status. This is the 
view of Frederick and Fischhoff (1998) when they write, “we do not believe that the demands 
of within-subject designs necessarily decrease the validity of the contingent responses – 
indeed, respondents in a within–subject quantity manipulation who report that a lot more of a 
good is worth a lot more to them may be revealing more about their true values than 
respondents in a between-subject design, who (collectively) indicate that a lot more of a good 
is only worth only a little more” (p. 116). More recently, Kahneman (2014) presented some 
reasons that also support the use of JE to guide social policy (and even individual decisions). 
He uses the example (taken from Johnson et al., 1993) of a study where subjects were asked 
in SE (between-subjects) their WTP for two insurance policies. In one group, the insurance 
policy paid $100,000 if the subject died, for any reason, during a holiday trip. In the second 
group, they were asked the WTP question for a similar policy that only paid $100,000 if the 
subject died, due to a terrorist attack, during the holiday trip. Subjects were willing to pay 
more for the second insurance policy. Kahneman (2014) argues that if people had been able 
to compare the two policies (that is, if they had evaluated the two policies in JE) they would 
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have seen that the first gave a higher value to them and they would have been willing to pay 
more for the first policy. He attributes this disparity between EMs to what he calls 
“substitution”. In SE subjects respond to a different question to the one they are being asked 
(substitution). Since subjects find it very difficult to imagine how much they are willing to 
pay for an insurance policy they respond emotionally; that is, they are willing to pay more for 
the second policy because they are more afraid of dying in a terrorist attack than of death 
itself. However, in JE they realise that it does not make sense to pay more for a policy that 
offers less protection. That is, under JE they would take the best decision. 
We can use this analogy when we move to health problems (this paper). When subjects are 
asked their WTP to reduce their risk of a certain injury they respond according to the degree 
of fear that the injury generates. This argument that the valuation of health states mainly 
reflects the degree of “shock reaction to, or fear associated with, that state” (p. 223) has 
been used by Dolan and Kahneman (2008, p. 223). It could be the case that states S1 and S3 
generate the same degree of (low) fear since they are both mild. In the same way, more 
severe health states generate more fear and this increases WTP. However, there are reasons 
to think that preferences based on the intensity of emotions do not seem to be a good guide 
for social policy (Slovic et al., 2004 and 2005; Finucane et al., 2000) because feelings are 
very often not well correlated with benefits. We can think that JE requires subjects to think 
more rationally and less emotionally and this corrects the lack of scope effect that we can 
see in SE; the fact that subjects adjust their responses in order to be internally consistent in 
JE is also a manifestation of their preferences. Subjects realise that it does not make sense 
to pay more for avoiding a health state that is less severe than another one. Subjects may not 
know very well what is the right WTP for S1 or S3 (stochastic preferences) but they know 
that WTP for S1 cannot be bigger than for S3. In that respect, as Frederick and Fischhoff 
(1998) state, in JE subjects “may be revealing more about their true values” than in SE. In 
fact, the results obtained in JE seem to have better properties to guide social policy than the 
results obtained in SE. It does not make sense to accept that subjects’ true preferences are 
that S1 and S3 are equally bad (as SE evaluations suggest) or that the benefit of preventing 
10 injuries like S6 is equivalent only to preventing 24 like S1. At face value, this seems 
implausible, given how different they are. We conclude that, in the presence of 
imprecise/stochastic preferences, JE can be a better EM than SE and that CV can be 
improved using this response mode. 
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Figures and tables 
Figure 1. Evaluation model 
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Figure 2. Screenshot for CV question in SE, Group 1 
 
Note. Find description of health state F in English in the appendix.  
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Figure 3. Screenshot for CV question in JE, Group 5 
 
Note. Find description of health states in English in the appendix.  
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Figure 4.Box-Plot of WTP in each Evaluation Mode. 
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Table I. Survey Design 
Evaluation 
Mode 
Group N 
Health states in Ranking, Visual Analogue 
Scale and MSG 
Health states in 
CV 
SE 
1 254 S1, S2, S7, S8 S1 
2 251 S3, S4, S7, S8 S4 
3 256 S3, S4, S5, S6 S3 
4 251 S1, S2, S5, S6 S6 
JE 
5 253 S1, S2, S7, S8 S1, S2, S7, S8 
6 250 S3, S4, S7, S8 S3, S4, S7, S8 
7 248 S3, S4, S5, S6 S3, S4, S5, S6 
8 253 S1, S2, S5, S6 S1, S2, S5, S6 
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Table II. Percentage distribution of sample characteristics 
 
 By group   
Variables 
Total 
sample 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Chi2 test 
(p-value) 
Population 
            
Gender           Censusa 
Male 48.8 49.6 47.4 48.1 49.0 48.2 50.0 49.2 48.6 
0.999 
49.3 
Female 51.2 50.4 52.6 52.0 51.0 51.8 50.0 50.8 51.4 50.6 
 
           
Age           Census 
18-29 17.8 18.9 18.7 18.4 18.3 14.2 19.2 16.9 17.4 
0.999 
16.1 
30-39 20.3 19.3 20.7 18.8 20.7 23.3 18.8 23.0 18.2 20.2 
40-49 20.7 20.9 21.1 19.5 21.5 20.2 19.2 19.4 24.1 19.4 
50-65 23.7 22.1 23.1 23.8 22.3 25.3 25.6 24.2 23.3 23.3 
>=66 17.5 18.9 16.3 19.5 17.1 17.0 17.2 16.5 17.0 20.9 
  
 
 
 
      
Education  
 
 
 
      LFSb 
No ed., Prim. or Lower 
Sec. 
50.8 52.8 45.8 46.1 53.8 49.8 54.0 53.2 51.4 
0.736 
54.8 
Upper Secondary 25.8 22.1 28.3 28.1 25.1 25.7 25.6 25.8 25.7 20.3 
Tertiary 23.4 25.2 25.9 25.8 21.1 24.5 20.4 21.0 22.9 24.8 
            
Employment Status  
 
 
 
      LFS 
Inactive 40.1 37.8 35.9 46.1 46.6 39.1 42.0 32.7 40.3 
0.034 
40.1 
Employed 47.8 49.6 49.4 44.9 45.4 47.4 42.8 53.2 49.4 47.1 
Unemployed 12.2 12.6 14.7 9.0 8.0 13.4 15.2 14.1 10.3 12.7 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Marital status  
 
 
 
      LFS 
Single 23.8 27.6 23.1 25.8 25.5 21.3 18.0 23.8 24.9 
0.475 
31.4 
Married 63.6 60.6 62.2 60.2 64.1 65.6 71.6 62.9 62.1 56.5 
Divorced 5.8 3.9 7.6 5.5 4.8 7.5 5.2 6.9 4.7 4.8 
Widow 6.9 7.9 7.2 8.6 5.6 5.5 5.2 6.5 8.3 7.3 
  
 
 
 
       
Household income (€)  
 
 
 
       
0 – 1,200 49.3 48.0 46.6 51.2 46.2 52.6 50.8 50.0 48.6 
0.318 
 
1,201 – 1,800 25.3 23.2 22.3 23.8 25.5 28.5 27.6 24.6 26.9  
>1,800 25.5 28.7 31.1 25.0 28.3 19.0 21.6 25.4 24.5  
  
 
 
 
       
Smoker  
 
 
 
       
Non smoker 66.8 65.4 64.5 70.3 64.1 64.8 71.6 63.7 69.6 
0.331 
 
Smoker 33.2 34.7 35.5 29.7 35.9 35.2 28.4 36.3 30.4  
  
 
 
 
       
Alcohol            
No 41.6 34.7 40.6 43.0 47.0 41.5 44.4 39.1 42.3 
0.196 
 
Yes 58.4 65.4 59.4 57.0 53.0 58.5 55.6 60.9 57.7  
a. Spanish 2011 census. 
b. 1st quarter of Spanish 2011 Labour Force Survey. 
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Table II. Percentage distribution of sample characteristics (Cont.) 
 
 By group   
Variables 
Total 
sample 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Chi2 test 
(p-value) 
Population 
            
Practices sports            
No 43.3 41.7 39.8 40.2 44.2 50.2 44.0 40.7 45.5 
0.279 
 
Yes 56.7 58.3 60.2 59.8 55.8 49.8 56.0 59.3 54.6  
 
           
Driver            
No 38.2 35.0 35.5 39.1 39.0 38.3 44.0 33.9 41.1 
0.293 
 
Yes 61.8 65.0 64.5 60.9 61.0 61.7 56.0 66.1 58.9  
 
 
 
 
 
       
Gambles  
 
 
 
       
No 29.6 26.8 27.9 30.1 28.7 32.8 34.4 24.6 31.6 
0.370 
 
Yes 70.4 73.2 72.1 69.9 71.3 67.2 65.6 75.4 68.4  
 
 
 
 
 
       
Self-reported 
Health 
 
 
 
 
       
Excellent 13.2 11.0 12.0 14.5 12.4 16.2 14.8 8.1 16.6 
0.257 
 
Very Good 33.7 33.9 28.3 35.9 32.7 36.0 32.4 33.9 36.4  
Good 38.1 40.6 45.0 33.6 39.4 34.0 40.8 40.7 30.8  
Moderate 12.9 12.2 12.8 14.1 13.2 11.5 10.0 14.9 14.6  
Bad 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.4 1.6  
 
           
Private Health 
insurance 
           
No 84.3 81.5 86.5 82.4 89.2 86.6 82.8 83.5 82.2 
0.184 
 
Yes 15.7 18.5 13.6 17.6 10.8 13.4 17.2 16.5 17.8  
  
 
 
 
       
Subjective risk  
 
 
 
       
Above average 7.6 11.0 7.6 7.0 6.4 4.7 6.4 9.7 8.3 
0.385 
 
Average 45.7 45.3 43.0 42.2 46.6 49.4 43.6 49.2 46.3  
Below average 43.4 41.3 44.2 46.1 43.4 43.5 46.4 39.5 42.7  
Do not know 3.3 2.4 5.2 4.7 3.6 2.4 3.6 1.6 2.8  
  
 
 
 
       
Suffered accident  
 
 
 
       
No 72.7 68.9 72.1 70.7 76.9 73.5 70.4 72.6 76.3 
0.427 
 
Yes 27.3 31.1 27.9 29.3 23.1 26.5 29.6 27.4 23.7  
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Table III. WTP in SE and JE (winsorizeda) 
Evaluation Mode  S1 S3 S4 S6 
SE 
 Mean 181.3 199.2 289.1 436.7 
 Median 50 50 101 100 
 N 254 256 251 251 
      
JE 
Group 5 Mean 72.7    
 Median 11    
 N 253    
 
SE vs. JE  
(t-test p-value) 
0.000    
  (Mann-Whitney p-value) 0.000    
       
 Group 6 Mean  117.2 226.6  
  Median  32.5 65  
  N  250 250  
  
SE vs. JE  
(t-test p-value) 
 
0.000 0.0762 
 
  (Mann-Whitney p-value)  0.003 0.015  
       
 Group 7 Mean  183.5 419.7 688.4 
  Median  60 100 200 
  N  248 248 248 
  
SE vs. JE  
(t-test p-value) 
 0.525 0.017 0.003 
  (Mann-Whitney p-value)  0.383 0.209 0.000 
       
 Group 8 Mean 84.1   584.4 
  Median 30   150 
  N 251   253 
  
SE vs. JE  
(t-test p-value) 
0.000   0.070 
  (Mann-Whitney p-value) 0.000   0.005 
       
 Total Mean 78.4 150.2 322.8 635.9 
  Median 20 50 100 160 
  N 504 498 498 501 
  
SE vs. JE  
(t-test p-value) 
0.000 0.012 0.427 0.009 
  (Mann-Whitney p-value) 0.000 0.229 0.497 0.000 
      
 Sensitivity to scope within EM (p-values) SE 
   S1 S3 S4 
SE 
 S3 0.495   
 S4 0.000 0.005  
 S6 0.000 0.000 0.0088b 
   JE 
JE 
 S3 0.000   
 S4 0.000 0.000  
 S6 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a. We substitute the value of the 12 highest observations with the value of the 13th highest observation. 
b. Not significant at 5% level using Mann-Whitney 
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Table IV. Differences within JE (t-tests)a 
  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
  
G5 G8 G5 G8 G6 G7 G6 G7 G7 G8 G7 G8 G5 G6 
S2 
G5 0.000 0.069 
            
G8 0.000 0.000 
            
S3 
G6 0.003 0.024 0.603 0.099 
          
G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.148 
          
S4 
G6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.139 
        
G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
S5 
G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
G8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.650 
      
S6 
G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 
    
G8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.765 0.000 
    
S7 
G5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.413 0.311 0.710 0.017 0.206 
  
G6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.307 0.025 0.762 0.469 
  
S8 
G5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.113 0.008 0.713 0.191 0.000 0.538 
G6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.001 0.350 0.061 0.003 0.609 
a. Shadowed cells correspond to within-subjects comparisons. 
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Table V. Error (WTPi>WTPj for i<j) and non-discrimination –ND- (WTPi=WTPj for 
i<j) (%) 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S7 
 Error ND Error ND Error ND Error ND Error ND Error ND 
S2 2 48.7           
S4     1.8 45.0       
S5 1.2 28.7 1.6 35.1 1.2 31.0 4.0 50.4     
S6 1.2 28.3 1.2 32.0 1.2 25.8 2.0 43.1 2.8 50.3   
S7 1.2 26.1 0.8 30.5 1.6 28.4 2.0 35.2     
S8 0.8 25.6 0.0 27.4 1.6 25.2 1.6 31.2   2.4 56.6 
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Appendix. Non Fatal Road Injuries (NFRIs) for valuation 
F (S1) W (S2) 
 Does not require hospitalisation, the 
patient is treated in outpatient settings 
 
After Effects: 
 Mild to moderate pain for 1 week 
 There are difficulties in work and leisure 
activities that gradually reduce 
 After 3 or 4 months, full recovery without 
any sequelae 
In hospital: 
 1 week 
 Mild pain 
 
After Effects: 
 Pain or discomfort for several weeks 
 There are difficulties in work and leisure 
activities that gradually reduce 
 After 3 or 4 months, full recovery without 
any sequelae 
X (S3) V (S4) 
In hospital: 
 2 weeks 
 Moderate pain 
 
After Effects: 
 Pain gradually reduces 
 There are difficulties in work and leisure 
activities that gradually reduce 
 After 18 months, full recovery without 
any sequelae 
In hospital: 
 2 weeks 
 Moderate pain  
 
After Effects: 
 moderate to severe pain for 1-4 weeks  
 Then, the pain gradually fades, but 
reappears when performing certain 
activities 
 There exist permanent restrictions to 
work and leisure activities 
S (S5) R (S6) 
In hospital: 
 4 weeks 
 Moderate to severe pain  
 
After Effects: 
 moderate to severe pain for 1-4 weeks  
 Then, the pain gradually fades, but 
reappears when performing certain 
activities 
 There exist permanent restrictions to 
work and leisure activities 
In hospital: 
 More than 4 weeks, possibly several 
months 
 Moderate to severe pain  
 
After Effects: 
 Lifelong chronic pain  
 There are major and permanent 
restrictions to work and leisure activities 
 Possibly some prominent and permanent 
scars 
 
N (S7) L (S8) 
In hospital: 
 More than 4 weeks, possibly several 
months 
 Inability to use the legs and arms, 
possibly due to paralysis or amputation 
 
After Effects: 
 Confined to a wheelchair for the rest of 
life 
 Dependent on others for many physical 
needs such as dressing and toileting 
In hospital: 
 More than 4 weeks, possibly several 
months 
 Head injuries that cause permanent brain 
damage 
 
After Effects: 
 Mental and physical abilities greatly 
reduced for the rest of your life 
 Dependent on others for many physical 
needs such as dressing and toileting 
Note: S1 was shown as F to the subject, S2 as W, S3 as X, S4 as X, S4 as V, S5 as S, S6 as R, S7 as N, and S8 
as L. 
 
